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Abstract:  We aim to show how Sextus Empiricus develops 
his attack on the téchnai in Against the Professors (M I-VI). 
First of all, we will outline the concept of stoicheîon (plural: 
stoicheîa) in Aristotle, for we think that the wide use of the 
concept by the Hellenistic Philosophers addresses itself to 
Aristotle’s employment of it. Thus, Sextus Empiricus ap-
proaches the téchnai through a paradigm internal to their own 
systematization, from their “elements” (stoicheîa). Secondly, 
we will take into consideration Sextus’ approach to grammar, 
and we link this discussion on grammar to the other téchnai. 
Finally, we aim to identify  the political and pedagogical 
consequences of Sextus’ approach.
Keywords: Pyrrhonism; Sextus Empiricus; “Against the 
Professors”; téchnai; stoicheîon.
Rodrigo Pinto de Brito - Universidade Federal de Sergipe (Brasil)
rodrigobrito@gmail.com
Alexandre Arantes - PUC-Rio (Brasil)
alexandre.skvirsky@gmail.com
Lauro Lane de Morais - Universidade Federal de Sergipe (Brasil)
lauromorais@msn.com
Rodrigo Pinto de Bri‑
to, Alexandre Arantes 
Pereira Skvirsky, Lauro 
Lane de Morais, ‘Some 
notes on Sextus Em‑
piricus' method of ap‑
proaching the téchnai’, 
p. 251‑279
252
nº 21, sep.-dec. 2017
1. Abbreviations:
Aristotle:
Met.= Metaphysics
Rh. = Rhetoric
Top. = Topics
Sextus Empiricus:
PH = Outlines of Pyrrhonism 
M I-VI = Against the Professors (or Mathematicians)
M I = Against the Grammarians = Adv. Gram.
M II = Against the Rhetoricians = Adv. Rhet.
M III = Against the Geometers = Adv. Geo.
M IV= Against the Arithmeticians = Adv. Arith.
M V= Against the Astrologers = Adv. Ast.
M VI= Against the Musicians = Adv. Mus.
M VII-XI = Against the Dogmatists
M VII = Against the Logicians I = Adv. Log. I
M VIII = Against the Logicians II = Adv. Log. II
M IX = Against the Physicists I = Adv. Phy. I
M X = Against the Physicists II = Adv. Phy. II
M XI = Against the Ethicists = Adv. Eth.
2. Methodological paradigm
This paper is not directly concerned with dem-
onstrating the feasibility of Scepticism, regardless 
of how Scepticism is understood, either in its Pyr-
rhonian or Academic varieties. It is also not con-
cerned with the later development and reception of 
the conceptual framework of Scepticism, although 
both subjects are going to be featured indirectly.
In this essay our goal is to think about the pos-
sible results of Sextus Empiricus’ line of attack on 
the téchnai (arts, or crafts) as it appears mainly in 
his work entitled Against the Professors. In this work, 
the philosopher/physician methodically attacks the 
disciplines that form part of the cyclical studies: 
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grammar, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, astrology 
and music1.
Sextus’ method for destroying the téchnai is to 
criticize the elements (stoicheîa) which constitute 
these téchnai. As far as we can see from the extant 
evidence, Aristotle is the first to develop a philo-
sophical conception of téchnē as a kind of craft in 
which the quality of the performance is related to 
the handling of certain constitutive elements (sto-
icheîa).  Although in Aristotle’s works the majority 
of the occurrences of the term stoicheîa refers to the 
constitutive elements of nature (cf. De Anima, 404a5; 
405b8; 410a2, 17-19; 410b11; 423b28; Met.985a25, 
32; 986a2, 18; 986b7-9; 987b19; etc.), there is a 
famous passage in the Rhetoric in which Aristotle 
exhorts one to discover first the various types of 
rhetoric in order to define them, so that one can 
investigate what the constitutive elements (stoicheîa) 
of each kind are (Rh.1358a35). Thus for Aristotle 
there are three kinds of rhetoric: deliberative, foren-
sic and demonstrative. For instance, the deliberative 
kind is aimed to exhort or dissuade about things to 
do – for its special time is the future (Rh. 1358b14) 
– and the stoicheîa which compound this kind of 
rhetoric are e.g. the specific kinds of arguments 
used to encourage or discourage a course of action 
in the face of a matter which needs a deliberation, 
as war, so the specific arguments to be employed 
are always inductive2.
1  Respectively as treated by Sextus in M I-VI. The Dialectic is 
generally treated in Adv. Log.
2  Cf. Rorty (1996); Gross; Walzer (2008). 
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We could add more examples of Aristotelian 
usages of stoicheîon and stoicheîa. But let us cite 
only Top.120b12: “Next we must go on to examine 
questions relating to genus and property. These are 
[the] elements (stoicheîa) in the question that relate 
to definitions…”3; and Top.163b24: 
…just as [with] geometry it is useful to be practised in 
the elements, and in arithmetic having the multiplica-
tion table up to ten at one’s fingers’ ends makes a great 
difference to one’s knowledge of the multiples of other 
numbers too, likewise also in arguments it is a great 
advantage to be well up in regard to first principles, and 
to have a thorough knowledge of propositions by heart. 
And we must not forget the treatment given to 
the letters qua elements (stoicheîa) of the syllables 
(Met. 993a4-10….) and qua principles (archaí) of 
the words (Met. 998a23-25).
In short, the Aristotelian concept of stoicheîon as 
“… the primary immanent thing, formally indivis-
ible into another form, of which something is com-
posed…” (Met.1014a25) was central to the foundation 
and development of sciences and crafts in Hellenistic 
age. This enabled Sextus Empiricus to use this Aris-
totelian concept in order to philosophically approach 
the sciences and crafts and to deal with the téchnai 
by starting with their constitutive elements. This was 
something also done by other physicians of his time, as 
for instance Galen, who argues in his work addressed 
3  All the cited passages from Topics are translated by  W. A. 
Pickard-Cambridge, in: Barnes (1991).
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to Patrophilus that the iatrikḗ téchnē is grounded on 
some elements (stoicheîa), namely health, illness, 
the physician (De constitutione artis medicae ad Pa-
trophilum I.247.7). But there is also a procedure or 
methodology of approaching the diseases by searching 
and trying to discover the elements (now understood 
as symptoms) which compound these diseases (De 
constitutione artis medicae ad Patrophilum I.249.2)4. 
However, instead of trying to justify the crafts by 
starting by its constitutive elements, Sextus emphasizes 
that he adopts “a method of attack by approximation, 
and once we have overthrown its [i.e. the astrological] 
principles and elements, we shall find that along with 
them also the structure of the rest of [the astrologers’] 
theories has been demolished.” (Adv. Ast. 49-53)5.
4  One could raise the question: what is the specific role of stoicheîon 
for Galen? Does the word have a pedagogical or a scientific role? When Galen 
presents the medicine to Patrophilus the word is used for displaying the most 
basic parts which compound and structure the science. So we can say that in 
De constitutione artis medicae ad Patrophilum the purpose of using stoicheîon is 
mainly pedagogical, but on the other hand, since Galen is displaying a science 
which was already structured, we can also say that he is not using stoicheîon 
merely by pedagogical purpose. Actually we can think that Galen is displaying 
it in the way he does because it is structured in this precise way.
5  All the English translations of Sextus Empiricus’ quotations 
are by R. G. Bury, with a few modifications by us. After these quotations 
we will always offer the respective Greek version and our Portuguese 
translation in the footnotes (after //). 
Adv. Ast. 49-53: “ἡμεῖς δὲ κατὰ τὸν ὁμόθεν τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως τρόπον 
τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ ὥσπερ στοιχεῖα ταύτης κινήσαντες ἕξομεν <σὺν> αὐταῖς 
καὶ τὴν τῶν λοιπῶν θεωρημάτων σύστασιν ἠθετημένην.”// “Mas nós, 
de acordo com um método de ataque por aproximação, teremos remo-
vido seus chamados princípios e elementos, e <junto> com eles [será] 
rejeitada a estrutura do resto de suas teorias.”
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Furthermore, according to Sextus Empiricus, “of 
the Sceptical philosophy one argument is called ‘gen-
eral’, the other ‘special’” (PH I, 5)6, and this drives 
us to a methodological paradigm similar to the one 
used by the physicians, for:
… just as the physicians who cure bodily ailments have 
remedies which differ in strength, and apply the severe 
ones to those whose ailments are severe and the milder 
to those mildly affected, – so too the Sceptic propounds 
arguments which differ in strength… (PH III, 280)7. 
So like Sextus would do, we are going to start by 
outlining how the Sceptic attacks the elements in 
general, and later we will turn to the art of grammar 
(téchnē grammatikḗ) in particular.
3. The refutation to the elements in general
The word stoicheîon has 29 occurrences in Sex-
tus Empiricus’ works, and stoicheîa (the plural of 
stoicheîon) has 538. In general, in PH the words 
6  PH I, 5: “Τῆς σκεπτικῆς οὖν φιλοσοφίας ὁ μὲν λέγεται καθόλου 
λόγος ὁ δὲ εἰδικός...” // “Então, da filosofia cética, um argumento se diz 
ser geral, o outro específico...”   
7  PH III, 280: “καθάπερ οὖν οἱ τῶν σωματικῶν παθῶν ἰατροὶ 
διάφορα κατὰ μέγεθος ἔχουσι βοηθήματα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν σφοδρῶς πεπονθόσι 
τὰ σφοδρὰ τούτων προσάγουσι, τοῖς δὲ κούφως τὰ κουφότερα, καὶ ὁ 
σκεπτικὸς οὕτως διαφόρους ἐρωτᾷ [καὶ] κατὰ ἰσχὺν λόγους...” // “Então, 
assim como os médicos têm remédios para os males corporais [que são] 
diferentes de acordo com a potência, e aplicam os violentos àqueles vio-
lentamente afetados, e os brandos aos brandamente, desse modo, também 
o cético propõe argumentos diferentes de acordo com a força...”
8  We shall emphasize that for searching and scanning the occur-
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are used to refer to physics, e.g. the atoms are the 
elements which compose nature (PH I, 147). Later, 
in PH II, 111, the word stoicheîa occurs four more 
times and it is employed in an altercation aimed at 
putting the atomistic physics in aporia.
In PH III, 30, taking the pre-Socratic conception 
of archḗ (principle) as a starting point, Sextus goes 
against everyone who postulated material principles 
(hylikaí archaí) in their physics, from Pherecydes of 
Syros – who stated the earth as the first principle 
– to Pythagoras – who stated the numbers. Sextus 
also mentions famous “physicists”, as Thales and the 
Milesian school, Xenophanes, Empedocles, Democri-
tus, Aristotle and Epicurus. But he does not forget 
the more obscure ones: Hippasus of Metapontum, 
Oenopides of Chios, Hippo of Rhegium, Onomac-
ritus, Heracleides Ponticus and Asclepiades the 
Bithynian9. Albeit in the steps PH III, 30-33 Sextus 
rences of the words “element/elements” in Sextus’ works, we selected 
only the plural and the singular of the nominative, vocative and accusa-
tive forms of the neuter stoicheîon, so this is not a complete scan. In a 
more exhaustive search (i.e. including datives, genitives in both singular 
and plural) someone can find at least 95 occurrences. Sure, our partial 
scan ignores some important occurrences, but as nominative, accusative 
or vocative, plural and singular, stoicheîon/stoicheîa can embrace the 
word as being the subject of the phrase or as being the object. So we 
have the opportunity to scan the word “element/elements” when Sextus 
employs it for saying something like: “Element(s) work(s)…”; and also 
for saying: “Y work (s) as element(s)”, for instance.
9  PH III, 30-33: “For Pherecydes of Syros declared earth to be the 
first principle of all things; Thales of Miletus, water; Anaximander (his pu-
pil), the Unlimited; Anaximenes and Diogenes of Apollonia, air; Hippasus 
of Metapontum, fire; Xenophanes of Colophon, earth and water; Oenop-
ides of Chios, fire and air; Hippo of Rhegium, fire and water; Onomacritus, 
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never uses the words stoicheîon or stoicheîa, rather 
he mentions archḗ or archaí, he considers that archḗ 
and stoicheîon are both kinds of “primary immanent 
thing[s], formally indivisible[s] into another form, 
in his Orphica, fire and water and earth; the School of Empedocles as well 
as the Stoics, fire, air, water and earth (…) Aristotle the Peripatetic <takes 
as his first principles> fire, air, water, earth, and the ‘revolving body’; 
Democritus and Epicurus, atoms; Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, homeo-
meries; Diodorus, surnamed Cronos, minimal and non-composite bod-
ies; Heracleides Ponticus and Asclepiades the Bithynian, homogeneous 
masses; the School of Pythagoras, the numbers; the Mathematicians, the 
limits of bodies; Strato the Physicist, the qualities.” // “Φερεκύδης μὲν 
γὰρ ὁ Σύριος γῆν εἶπε τὴν πάντων εἶναι ἀρχήν, Θαλῆς δὲ ὁ Μιλήσιος 
ὕδωρ, Ἀναξίμανδρος δὲ ὁ ἀκουστὴς τούτου τὸ ἄπειρον, Ἀναξιμένης δὲ 
καὶ Διογένης ὁ Ἀπολλωνιάτης ἀέρα, Ἵππασος δὲ ὁ Μεταποντῖνος πῦρ, 
Ξενοφάνης δὲ ὁ Κολοφώνιος γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ, Οἰνοπίδης δὲ ὁ Χῖος πῦρ καὶ 
ἀέρα, Ἵππων δὲ ὁ Ῥηγῖνος πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ, Ὀνομάκριτος δὲ ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς 
πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα καὶ τοὺς  Στωικοὺς 
πῦρ ἀέρα ὕδωρ γῆν (...) οἱ δὲ περὶ Ἀριστοτέλην τὸν Περιπατητικὸν πῦρ 
ἀέρα ὕδωρ γῆν τὸ κυκλοφορητικὸν σῶμα, Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος 
ἀτόμους, Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ ὁ Κλαζομένιος ὁμοιομερείας, Διόδωρος δὲ 
ὁ ἐπικληθεὶς Κρόνος ἐλάχιστα καὶ ἀμερῆ σώματα, Ἡρακλείδης δὲ ὁ 
Ποντικὸς καὶ Ἀσκληπιάδης ὁ Βιθυνὸς ἀνάρμους ὄγκους, οἱ δὲ περὶ 
Πυθαγόραν τοὺς ἀριθμούς, οἱ δὲ μαθηματικοὶ τὰ πέρατα τῶν σωμάτων, 
Στράτων δὲ ὁ φυσικὸς τὰς ποιότητας.” // “Pois, por um lado, o sírio 
Ferecides disse ser terra o princípio de tudo; por outro lado, o milésio 
Tales, água; mas seu ouvinte Anaximandro, o ilimitado; Anaxímenes 
e o apoloniense Diógenes, ar; o metapôntico Hipaso, fogo; o colofônio 
Xenófanes, terra e água; o quío Oenopides, fogo e ar; o regiense Hipo, 
fogo e água; Onomacritos, em seu Orphica, fogo, água e terra; os em 
torno de Empédocles, assim como os estoicos, fogo, ar, água e terra; (...) 
os em torno do peripatético Aristóteles, fogo, ar, água, terra e “corpo 
que revolve” [i.e. o éter]; Demócrito e Epicuro, átomos; o clazomênio 
Anaxágoras, homeomerias; Diodoro, chamado Cronos, corpos míni-
mos e indivisíveis; o pôntico Heracleides e o bitínio Asclepíades, massas 
homogêneas; os em torno de Pitágoras, os números; os matemáticos, os 
limites dos corpos; Strato, o físico, as qualidades.”
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of which something is composed…” as defined by 
Aristotle (Met.1014a25),. So it makes archḗ and sto-
icheîon share the common feature of being material 
principles (hylikaí archaí). 
But, since there is a great divergence amongst the 
physicists about the real constitution of the material 
principles, no matter how one calls them – archḗ 
or stoicheîon – and no matter what one thinks they 
are – earth, water, wind, fire or atoms – the sceptic 
does not give assent to any of the theories, because 
they cannot be proved (PH III, 33-36).
And the theories cannot be proved because:
1- If there is a proof, it must be true.
2- But for obtaining a true proof one needs a true 
criterion.
3- And for having a true criterion one needs first 
a proof that this criterion is true.
4- This proof must be true (= step 1).
So the argument is circular, and it does not al-
low the development of reasoning (PH III, 35). 
Furthermore, if there is not a proof and a criterion 
for judging and giving assent to material principles, 
it makes the material principles – both archaí and 
stoicheîa – impossible to be apprehended, no mat-
ter what one thinks they are (PH III, 37). And it is 
in this train of thought that some other important 
occurrences of stoicheîa appear: PH III, 55.6; 62.6; 
152.1,4 (with two occurrences); 153.1,4.
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But the quarrel shown above can deceive us, 
making us think that only physicists had theories 
concerning stoicheîon. And in this case we will forget 
that the word stoicheîon is much more overarching, 
since it can embrace letters – understood as ele-
ments of words – and also phrases – understood 
as elements of reasoning and of discourse (lógos).  
So the word stoicheîa occurs in Adv. Log. II, 99 
(or M VIII, 99)10, for instance,  in an argument 
against the assertion that the propositions become 
more basic while they become simpler, which makes 
them become in discourse similar to the elements in 
physics. This theory is attributed to the Dialectical 
School. The Sextan argumentation employed leading 
to aporia here has the same features of the argument 
against the physicists mentioned above11, i.e., the 
demonstration of the disagreements (diaphōníai) 
about what the primary elements should be, about 
their behavior and function, and mainly their inap-
prehensibility (Adv. Log. II, 319.4; 336.1,3). 
4. The refutation of the grammatical notion 
of letters as specific elements of words
Let us first present a few clarifying thoughts about 
the chronological order and sequence of Sextus’ 
works, as this is directly relevant for an appropri-
ate contextualization of his arguments in Against 
10  We’ll show in the next section (i.e. 4) why we leave the notation 
based in the M family (M I-XI). 
11  And this agenda is expanded in Adv. Phy. I, 212.6; 359.3; II, 
248.8; 249.5; 253.4 (with two occurrences of stoicheîa);  254.5 (with two 
occurrences); 258.3, 260.2; 312.4.
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the Grammarians. The usual organization of Sextus 
Empiricus’ works divides them into three blocks: 
the first being composed of the Outlines of Pyrrhon-
ism (PH), subdivided into three books; the second 
is composed of six works organized and named as 
Against the Professors (or Mathematicians), usually 
referred to as M I to M VI (Against the Grammar-
ians; Against the Rhetoricians; Against the Geometers; 
Against the Arithmeticians; Against the Astrologers; 
Against the Musicians); and the third is called Against 
the Dogmatists, usually referred to as M VII to M XI, 
and composed by three works (Against the Logicians, 
in two books; Against the Physicists, in two books; 
and Against the Ethicists).
But we prefer to leave this usual subdivision, 
since it implies that the block Against the Dogmatists 
would be a later work than the block Against the 
Professors. It appears to us that the contrary is true, 
i.e. the block Against the Dogmatists precedes the 
block Against the Professors. This assumption seems 
to be justified because the last book of Against the 
Dogmatists – Against the Ethicists, usually referred 
to as M XI – is the only book in its block which has 
as one of its themes the performance of the téch-
nai, among other things. And this performance is 
treated according to Sextus’ methodological agenda, 
i.e. beginning with the most general – where phi-
losophy appears as the art of living (téchnē perì tòn 
bíon) (Adv. Eth. 168) – towards the most particular 
– where Sextus introduces the arguments which 
are going to be developed in the block Against the 
Professors, considered by us to be posterior. And 
the problems about the stoicheîa arise in Adv. Eth., 
precisely preceding and maybe introducing the 
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discussions which appear in Adv. Gram., where these 
“elements” (stoicheîa) are understood as elements of 
grammar, i.e. the letters.
Thus Sextus begins Adv. Gram. by clarifying the 
methodology to be employed, emphasizing that he 
will use some arguments that are more general and 
others that are more specific. So, on the one hand, 
for attacking the usefulness of the téchnai, general 
arguments are employed in order to weaken those 
stoicheîa which are inherent parts of the process of 
teaching and learning all the crafts, for example: 
the studies, the content to be taught, as well as the 
nature and function of discourse, teacher and stu-
dent. These topics make up the first steps of Adv. 
Gram. On the other hand, a specific argument is one 
which attacks the specific elements of each téchnē. 
But if the letters are the specific grammatical 
elements, how can the Sceptic write against the art 
of grammar without contradicting himself ? This 
requires special care from Sextus, and he tells us:
And in any case even if we wished we should not be 
able to abolish it without upsetting ourselves; for if the 
arguments which show that grammatistic12 is useless 
are themselves useful but can neither be remembered 
nor passed on to posterity without it, then grammatistic 
is useful. Yet it might be thought by some that Timon, 
the expounder of Pyrrho’s views, is of the contrary 
opinion when he says: 
12  “Grammatistic” is a neologism usually employed to translate 
the Greek word γραμματιστική, meaning the teaching and learning of 
the “first letters”.
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“Grammar’s an art that a man need neither heed nor 
consider
When he is still being taught the Punic symbols of 
Cadmus”.
This, however, does not appear to be the case. For the 
phrase he uses, “he need neither heed nor consider,” 
is not aimed against the actual grammatistic by which 
the Punic symbols of Cadmus are taught; for if a man 
is being taught it, how can he have paid no attention 
to it? What he means is rather this: “when a man has 
been taught the Punic symbols of Cadmus he need pay 
no attention to any further art of letters”; and this does 
not refer to the uselessness of the art which is found 
to deal with the elements and with employing them in 
writing and reading, but of that which is boastful and 
needlessly inquisitive. For while the handling of the 
elements contributes to the conduct of life, not to be 
contented with what is given by the observation of the 
elements and attempting further to show that some of 
them are naturally vowels, others consonants, and that 
of the vowels some are naturally short, others long, 
others doubtful and indifferently long or short, and in 
general all the other rules that are taught by the con-
ceived Grammarians <are unprofitable proceedings>.  
(Adv. Gram. 53-55)13. 
13  Adv. Gram.  53-55: “ἀμέλει γοῦν οὐδὲ θελήσαντες 
δυνησόμεθα ταύτην ἀπεριτρέπτως ἀνελεῖν· εἰ γὰρ αἱ ἄχρηστον 
διδάσκουσαι τὴν γραμματιστικὴν ἐπιχειρήσεις εἰσὶν εὔχρηστοι, 
οὔτε δὲ μνημονευθῆναι οὔτε τοῖς αὖθις παραδοθῆναι χωρὶς αὐτῆς 
δύνανται, χρειώδης ἐστὶν ἡ γραμματιστική. καίτοι δόξειεν ἄν τισιν 
ἐπὶ τῆς ἐναντίας εἶναι προλήψεως ὁ προφήτης τῶν Πύρρωνος λόγων 
Τίμων ἐν οἷς φησι   
  γραμματική, τῆς οὔ τις ἀνασκοπὴ οὐδ› ἀνάθρησις 
  ἀνδρὶ διδασκομένῳ Φοινικικὰ σήματα Κάδμου· 
οὐ μὴν οὕτως ἔχειν φαίνεται· τὸ γὰρ ὑπ› αὐτοῦ λεγόμενον οὐκ 
ἔστι τοιοῦτον κατ› αὐτῆς τῆς γραμματιστικῆς, καθ› ἣν διδάσκεται 
τὰ Φοινικικὰ σήματα Κάδμου, τὸ ‘οὐδεμία ἐστὶν ἀνασκοπὴ οὐδ› 
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ἀνάθρησις’· πῶς γάρ, εἰ διδάσκεταί τις αὐτήν, οὐδεμίαν ἔσχηκεν 
ἐπιστροφὴν αὐτῆς; ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοιοῦτό φησι ‘διδαχθέντι τὰ Φοινικικὰ 
σήματα Κάδμου οὐδεμιᾶς ἄλλης παρὰ τοῦτό ἐστι γραμματικῆς 
ἐπιστροφή’, ὅπερ καταστρέφει οὐκ εἰς τὸ ἀχρηστεῖν ταύτην τὴν ἐν τοῖς 
στοιχείοις καὶ τῷ δι› αὐτῶν γράφειν τε καὶ ἀναγινώσκειν θεωρουμένην, 
ἀλλὰ τὴν πέρπερον καὶ περιεργοτέραν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τῶν στοιχείων 
χρῆσις ἤπειγεν εἰς τὴν τοῦ βίου διεξαγωγήν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀρκεῖσθαι τῇ ἐκ 
τῆς παρατηρήσεως τούτων παραδόσει, προς επιδεικνύναι δὲ ὡς τάδε 
μέν ἐστι φωνάεντα τῇ φύσει τάδε δὲ σύμφωνα, καὶ τῶν φωναέντων 
τὰ μὲν φύσει βραχέα τὰ δὲ μακρὰ τὰ δὲ δίχρονα καὶ κοινὰ μήκους 
τε καὶ συστολῆς, καὶ καθόλου τὰ λοιπὰ περὶ ὧν οἱ τετυφωμένοι τῶν 
γραμματικῶν διδάσκουσιν <ἄχρηστά ἐστιν>.”// “E em cada caso, mesmo 
que queiramos, não podemos aboli-la sem contradizermo-nos, pois, 
se os argumentos que demonstram que a gramatística é inútil são eles 
próprios eficazes, mas não podem ser relembrados e nem transmitidos 
à posteridade sem ela, então a gramatística é útil. Mas talvez possa ser 
pensado que Timão, o expositor dos discursos de Pirro, é da opinião 
contrária quando diz: 
Gramática, dela não há qualquer consideração nem exame
 no homem que aprende os símbolos fenícios de Cadmo. 
Mas esse não parece ser o caso. Pois o dito por ele “não há qualquer 
consideração nem exame” não é de fato dirigido contra a própria gra-
matística, por meio da qual se ensina os “símbolos fenícios de Cadmo”, 
pois como [é possível], se alguém a ensina, não ter dela nenhuma 
consideração? Antes, o que [Timão] quer dizer é algo como: “aquele 
que aprendeu os símbolos fenícios de Cadmo não tem que recorrer a 
qualquer outra gramática além dela”, o que se refere não à inutilidade 
desta [gramática] que lida com os elementos do alfabeto e com o em-
prego deles na escrita e na leitura, mas antes à presunção e desneces-
sidade da outra gramática. A prática com os elementos, por um lado, 
contribui para a conduta na vida, mas, por outro lado, não se satisfazer 
com o que é ensinado a partir da sua observação, e tentar mostrar, por 
exemplo, que alguns [dos elementos] são, por natureza, vogais, outros 
consoantes, e que, dentre as vogais, algumas são, por natureza, breves, 
outras longas, outras ambíguas e comuns em quantidade e contração, 
e, em geral, todas as outras coisas que são ensinadas pelos conceituados 
gramáticos <são [procedimentos] inúteis>.
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This long passage speaks for itself: Sextus knows 
that he would be contradicting himself if he intended 
to put the utility of grammar in aporia, so he di-
vides the genus of grammar into two species: gram-
matistic and grammar. The first one is responsible 
for teaching how to deal with letters, i.e. Cadmus’ 
Punic symbols, and it is useful and should not be 
despised, otherwise one would be unlettered. The 
second kind of grammar has its specialists – headed 
by the grammarians of Alexandria and Pergamum 
– who dedicate themselves to problems about the 
natural origin of utterances, sounds, etymology 
and the correct tones. And these grammarians are 
especially worried about the elements of grammar. 
If the elements of grammar are the letters, we have 
twenty-four elements that have to compose some-
thing (the words) and which have to be indivisible 
into another form, they are seven vowels (α, ε, η, ι, 
ο, υ, ω) and seventeen consonants. However there 
are some consonants which are double: ζ, ξ, ψ; for ζ 
is composed by σ and δ, ξ is composed by κ and σ, 
ψ is composed by π and σ. But if they are double or 
composed by two other consonants, how can they be 
indivisible? In addition, if they cannot be indivisible, 
how can they be elements? And what about the vow-
els? For α, ι, υ have double times (they are díchrona), 
and as such they have a double intrinsic nature which 
can be expressed and proffered sometimes as long 
and sometimes as short, sometimes as smooth and 
sometimes as rough, so how can they have the one-
ness required for an element (Adv. Gram. 100-116)?
It briefly shows the kinds of quarrels in which the 
grammarians were involved, quarrels generated by 
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their own peculiar projects of orthographic reform. 
And they also engage themselves in arguments that 
reveal the inutility, the vanity and the incoherence 
of the téchnē grammatikḗ.    
For in a time of wide usage of the Greek language, 
spoken in various ways by people mostly unlettered, 
what would be the utility of systematizing an artifi-
cial Greek language, by creating and imposing spirits 
and tones for letters, genders and declinations for 
names, and new conjugations for verbs, if the abso-
lute majority of people would not even know these 
modifications? What would be the parameter used 
to systematize the Hellenistic or the late-Ancient 
Greek, the old language of Homer? Must everyone 
speak as Homer did? 
These are samples of questions asked by Sextus 
in Adv. Gram., but if according to Sextus an art like 
the rhetoric does not have an aim, the grammar on 
the other hand, albeit it has an aim, is not useful. 
According to the grammarians themselves, the aim 
of grammar is to give rise to a good and beautiful 
Greek language, or the good and beautiful usage of 
Greek language (hellēnismós), serving as a preventive 
measure against solecisms and barbarisms, consid-
ered by grammarians as being linguistic mistakes. 
But if as we saw, the great majority of Greek speakers 
would not even know the grammatical parameters 
developed by the grammarians, it makes the purpose 
of systematizing the Greek language useless and vain.
Then Sextus makes the opposite argument by 
postulating the common use of language as the cri-
terion for good and beautiful Greek. Thus, Sextus 
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reformulates the aesthetic aspect by taking it away 
from the domain of the experts, and instead claims 
that something is called beautiful if it is in accordance 
with the standards of beauty engendered by the com-
munities themselves. Moreover, Sextus emphasizes 
the common use of language as pragmatic criterion, 
since one who speaks right speaks according to 
linguistic conventions that are also engendered by 
the communities and are not creations of experts. 
Thus the project of the grammarians to promote 
themselves as the ultimate owners of criteria for the 
useful, good and beautiful speech is undermined by 
Sextus’ argument.
We shall illustrate this point of Sextus pleading 
for a communal criterion of aesthetic beauty with 
the following passage of Adv. Mus. (29-34), as it 
emphasizes the theme of pleasure and it is related to 
the discussions proposed in general about the arts 
and specifically to those which appear in Adv. Gram.:
… the principal argument against music is that if it 
is useful it is alleged to be useful on the ground that 
he who has practiced music compared with ordinary 
people gets more pleasure from hearing musical per-
formances; or because the elements of music are the 
same as those of the science of the subject-matter of 
philosophy, (which is much like what we previously said 
about grammar); or because the Universe is ordered 
according to harmony, as the Pythagorean fraternity 
declare, and we need the theorems of Music in order to 
understand the Whole of things; or because tunes of a 
certain kind affect the character of the soul. But it will 
not be stated that music is useful because musicians 
as compared with ordinary people get more pleasure 
from listening to performances. For, firstly, the pleasure 
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felt by ordinary people is not inevitable as are those 
caused by food, drink and warmth after hunger, thirst 
and cold; and secondly, even if they are inevitable we 
can enjoy them without musical skill; infants, certainly, 
are lulled to sleep by listening to a tuneful cradle-song, 
and irrational animals are charmed by the sound of 
the flute and pipe, seeing that dolphins, as we are 
told, swim up to ships as they are being rowed along 
because of the pleasure they take in the tunes played 
by flutes; yet neither the infants nor the animals are 
likely to have skill in music or understanding of it (…) 
just as we enjoy tasting food or wine though without 
the art of cooking food or that of wine-tasting… (Adv. 
Mus. 29-34)14.
14  Adv. Mus. 29-34: “... προηγουμένως δὲ λέγεται [καὶ] κατὰ 
μουσικῆς ὡς εἴπερ ἐστὶ χρειώδης, ἤτοι κατὰ τοῦτο λέγεται χρειοῦν 
παρόσον <ὁ> μουσικευσάμενος πλεῖον παρὰ τοὺς ἰδιώτας τέρπεται 
πρὸς μουσικῶν ἀκροαμάτων, ἢ παρόσον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι 
μὴ προπαιδευθέντας ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, ἢ τῷ τὰ αὐτὰ στοιχεῖα τυγχάνειν τῆς 
μουσικῆς καὶ <τῆς> τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν πραγμάτων εἰδήσεως, ὁποῖόν 
τι καὶ περὶ γραμματικῆς ἀνώτερον ἐλέγομεν· ἢ τῷ κατὰ ἁρμονίαν 
διοικεῖσθαι τὸν κόσμον, καθὼς φάσκουσι Πυθαγορικῶν παῖδες, δέεσθαί 
τε ἡμᾶς τῶν μουσικῶν θεωρημάτων πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅλων εἴδησιν, ἢ 
τῷ τὰ ποιὰ μέλη ἠθοποιεῖν τὴν ψυχήν. οὔτε δὲ τῷ τοὺς μουσικοὺς 
πλέον τέρπεσθαι παρὰ τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκροαμάτων λέγοιτ’ ἂν 
χρειοῦν ἡ μουσική. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἀναγκαία ἰδιώταις ἡ τέρψις 
καθάπερ αἱ ἐπὶ λιμῷ ἢ δίψει ἢ κρύει γινόμεναι ὑπὸ πόματος ἢ ἀλέας· 
εἶτα κἂν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχωσι, δυνάμεθα χωρὶς μουσικῆς ἐμπειρίας 
αὐτῶν ἀπολαύειν. νήπια γοῦν ἐμμελοῦς μινυρίσματος κατακούοντα 
κοιμίζεται, καὶ τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζῴων ὑπὸ αὐλοῦ καὶ σύριγγος κηλεῖται, 
οἵ τε δελφῖνες, ὡς λόγος, αὐλῶν μελῳδίαις τερπόμενοι προσνήχονται 
τοῖς ἐρεσσομένοις σκάφεσιν· ὧν οὐδὲ ὁπότερον ἔοικε μουσικῆς 
ἔχειν ἐμπειρίαν ἢ ἔννοιαν (...) ὃν τρόπον χωρὶς ὀψαρτυτικῆς καὶ 
οἰνογευστικῆς ἡδόμεθα ὄψου ἢ οἴνου γευσάμενοι...” // “...o principal 
argumento contra a música é que se é útil, é pretensamente útil tendo 
por fundamento que, quem cultiva o gosto pela música, comparado 
aos ordinários, deleita-se mais ao ouvir execuções musicais, ou tendo 
por fundamento que é impossível os homens serem bons a não ser que 
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We are now going to say a few words about the 
reception of Sextus’ arguments against the gram-
marians and against their project of systematizing 
the Greek language through strictly theoretical 
paradigms, like the concept of “element”. 
First of all, since Sextus makes the common us-
age be the ultimate criterion for handling the Greek 
language, considering that there are lots of usages, 
one must have a methodology for approaching these 
usages. And, as we saw above, Sextus is against the 
theoretical approach used by grammarians, so his 
approach needs to be strictly based on something 
non-theoretical. It makes the experience (empeiría) 
be the methodology to be employed. 
tenham sido educados através dela, ou porque os elementos subjacentes 
à música são as mesmas matérias cujos quais a filosofia conhece, o que 
é como o que dissemos anteriormente sobre a gramática, ou porque 
o cosmos é ordenado de acordo com a harmonia, como diziam os 
seguidores de Pitágoras, e precisamos dos teoremas da música para 
entendermos o todo das coisas, ou porque tal melodia molda o caráter 
da alma. Mas não terá fundamento [dizer] que a música é útil porque 
os músicos, comparados com os ordinários, têm mais prazer quando 
ouvem as execuções. Pois, primeiramente, por um lado, porque certa-
mente esse prazer não é necessário para as pessoas comuns tal como 
o prazer que surge da bebida ou do calor, após a fome, a sede e o frio; 
mesmo que fossem necessários, poderíamos desfrutar-lhes sem habi-
lidades musicais. Como as crianças são levadas ao sono por cantigas 
de ninar, e animais são encantados pelos sons da flauta e da siringe. 
Assim, como se diz, os golfinhos cantam para os barcos quando deles 
se aproximam por conta do prazer que sentem com as melodias das 
flautas, mas ambos [,crianças e animais,] não são especialistas em 
música, e nem têm a empiria e nem o entendimento. (...) assim como 
não se precisa ser cozinheiro ou fabricar vinhos para deleitar-se com 
boa comida ou bebida...”
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So we could say that the block to which Adv. 
Gram. belongs – Against the Professors – is not a 
strictly destructive work, even if it radically under-
mines any project of building theories linked to the 
cyclical studies. Alternatively, Sextus employs the 
Sceptic destructive dýnamis in order to find a new, 
constructive way (póros) among the aporetic discus-
sions of the theorists and professors. But this póros 
is not self-evident or explicitly developed, but needs 
to be buildup. And it is through experience that one 
shall recognize this póros, as well as its limits. So the 
block named Against the Professors can be considered 
as containing a conception of knowledge which we 
can call empiricist and pragmatic, since it seeks the 
truth only by approximation and adequacy.
Turning now to the point of practicability, or the 
pragmatic feasibility of the Sextan Scepticism, we 
consider Sextus to be able to say that this praise of 
an empiricist model of approximated knowledge is 
conducted as a description, or a chronicle. He simply 
narrates what appears to him, and since appearances 
are not open to discussions, the only thing that can 
be discussed about them is whether they are such 
as the objects that generate them, or not. But the 
Sceptical cognition is not located in the knowledge/
world axis, around which the concepts of true and 
false revolve. Instead, the Sceptic ignores this axis, 
and appearances are all that matters to him, for ap-
pearances are coercive. So the Sceptic is not worried 
about the relation and adequacy of any perceptions 
regarding to any state of affairs.
The Sceptic is compelled by affections, and these 
affections cannot be refuted because they lack true 
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or false value. So, if here the defense of a Scepti-
cal empiricism is the defense of Sextus’ personal 
experience, Sextus cannot be accused of dogmatiz-
ing, because he acts exclusively in conformity with 
his own experience. In the Sceptical point of view, 
ignoring experience in favor of an abstract truth 
linked to the beauty and the good would be a kind 
of aesthetic, epistemic, or ethical dogmatism.
Finally, this drives us back to the point of the ap-
preciation of the personal experience, a theme which 
can make us think about other dimensions of the 
reception of Sextus’ works: politics and anthropol-
ogy. For in “defending” the experience of the plain 
human being and making it a sufficient possibility 
for understanding the world, the Scepticism can not 
only be understood as an exhortation of the phaûlos 
(ordinary person) against arrogant and pretentious 
epistemologies, but also as an admonition against 
the subordination and control of communities of 
plain people by elitist political bodies that judge 
themselves to be better, or by dominant power struc-
tures that treat ordinary people as vain and inferior. 
Furthermore, this defense of the phaûlos can become 
a defense of the idiótēs (the private human being) 
in the face of hegemonic power.
But of course, reducing the scope of experience 
to the dimension of the strictly private and personal 
could be a snare here, and one could imagine that the 
Sceptic is a kind of radical empiricist and solipsist, 
who only accepts his own and peculiar impressions. 
And this Sceptic could (and why not?) act mistak-
enly during his entire life. But in order to avoid 
such mistakes there is a parameter for correction: 
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one should perform actions according to one’s own 
experiences in the arena of the communal life, the 
arena of the habit (éthos), and of the convention or 
law (nomós), and also the arena of the communal 
(koinós), all of which the Sceptic participates in 
(PH I 237.7). 
So Sextus’ Pyrrhonian Scepticism can be inter-
preted as a defense of the community (koinōnía). 
Additionally, even when the Greek habits are com-
pared with the habits of other peoples there are 
no reasons for thinking that the Greek habits are 
better than the barbarian ones. Thus, all the habits 
are considered to be of equal standing, especially if 
we keep in mind the tenth mode of Aenesidemus 
(PH I, 145-163) and the Sextan observations on the 
plurality of habits and conducts. So, Sextus says: 
… amongst us sodomy is regarded as shameful or rather 
illegal, but by the Germani, they say, it is not looked 
on as shameful, but as a customary thing (…) having 
intercourse with a woman, too, in public, although 
deemed by us to be shameful, is not thought to be 
shameful by some of the Indians (…) with us tattooing 
is held to be shameful and degrading, but many of the 
Egyptians and Sarmatians tattoo their offspring…(PH 
III, 199-203)15
15 PH III, 199-203: “παρ’ ἡμῖν μὲν αἰσχρόν, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ 
παράνομον νενόμισται τὸ τῆς ἀρρενομιξίας, παρὰ Γερμανοῖς δέ, ὡς 
φασίν, οὐκ αἰσχρόν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἕν τι τῶν συνήθων (...)καὶ τὸ δημοσίᾳ 
γυναικὶ μίγνυσθαι, καίτοι παρ’ ἡμῖν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι δοκοῦν, παρά τισι 
τῶν Ἰνδῶν οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι νομίζεται (...)τὸ ἐστίχθαι παρ› ἡμῖν μὲν 
αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἄτιμον εἶναι δοκεῖ, πολλοὶ δὲ Αἰγυπτίων καὶ Σαρματῶν 
στίζουσι τὰ γεννώμενα...”// “...entre nós a sodomia é considerada 
vergonhosa ou mesmo ilegal, mas entre os germânicos, dizem,  é vista 
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And what about the Sceptic? What does he do in 
the face of the plurality of habits?
Accordingly, the Sceptic, seeing so great a diver-
sity of usages, suspends judgement as to the natural 
existence of anything good or bad or (in general) 
fit or unfit to be done, therein abstaining from the 
rashness of dogmatism; and he follows undogmati-
cally the ordinary rules of life, and because of this he 
remains impassive in respect of matters of opinion, 
while in conditions that are necessitated his emo-
tions are moderate; for thought, as a human being, 
he suffers emotion through his senses, yet because 
he does not also opine that what he suffers is evil by 
nature, the emotion he suffers is moderate. For the 
added opinion that a thing is of such a kind is worse 
than the actual suffering itself, just as sometimes the 
patients themselves bear a surgical operation, while 
the bystanders swoon away because of their opinion 
that there exists by nature something good or bad 
or, generally, fit or unfit to be done, is disquieted 
in various ways.  (PH III, 235- 237)16.
não somente como não vergonhosa, mas mesmo como habitual (...)fazer 
sexo com uma mulher em público, embora seja por nós considerado 
vergonhoso, não é considerado vergonhoso por alguns indianos (...) 
para nós a tatuagem é considerada vergonhosa , mas muitos egípcios 
e sármatas tatuam a prole...”
16 PH III, 235- 237: “ Ὁ τοίνυν σκεπτικὸς τὴν τοσαύτην 
ἀνωμαλίαν τῶν πραγμάτων ὁρῶν ἐπέχει μὲν περὶ τοῦ φύσει τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ 
κακὸν ἢ ὅλως πρακτέον εἶναι, κἀν τούτῳ τῆς δογματικῆς ἀφιστάμενος 
προπετείας, ἕπεται δὲ ἀδοξάστως τῇ βιωτικῇ τηρήσει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο 
ἐν μὲν τοῖς δοξαστοῖς ἀπαθὴς μένει, ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατηναγκασμένοις 
μετριοπαθεῖ· ὡς μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωπος αἰσθητικὸς πάσχει, μὴ προςδοξάζων 
δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο ὃ πάσχει κακόν ἐστι φύσει, μετριοπαθεῖ. τὸ γὰρ 
προσδοξάζειν τι τοιοῦτο χεῖρόν ἐστι καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πάσχειν, ὡς ἐνίοτε 
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5.- Conclusion 
As we said in the beginning of this paper, we were 
not directly concerned either with problems about 
the feasibility of Scepticism or about the reception 
of Sextus’ arguments. We were mainly concerned 
with the Sextan approach to the téchnai which ap-
pears in Against the Professors, and especially with 
the methodology employed by him in his destructive 
arguments, for instance: his method of arguing first 
against general aspects of all issues, and arguing later 
against the particular aspects. And this method, 
once used against the concept of stoicheîon, made 
Sextus argue first against the own concept and later 
against the specific stoicheîa of grammar.  
But how can someone not be worried about the 
practical consequences of Scepticism if against the 
τοὺς μὲν τεμνομένους ἢ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτο πάσχοντας φέρειν, τοὺς δὲ 
παρεστῶτας διὰ τὴν περὶ τοῦ γινομένου δόξαν ὡς φαύλου λειποψυχεῖν. 
ὁ μέντοι γε ὑποθέμενος τὸ φύσει τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ ὅλως πρακτέον 
ἢ μὴ πρακτέον εἶναι ταράσσεται ποικίλως.” // “Assim o cético, tendo 
visto uma grande anomalia <acerca destas> questões, suspende o juízo 
sobre se algo é por natureza bom, ou mal, ou no geral praticável, aqui 
renunciando à precipitação do dogmático, seguindo inopinadamente 
a observância da vida comum, e por isso permanece impassível quanto 
às opiniões, mas quanto ao que é forçoso, <é> moderado; pois como 
homem sensível, sofre <sensações>, mas não <tem> opiniões adiciona-
das, como <a opinião> de que aquilo do que sofre é mau por natureza, 
<portanto, é> moderado. Pois a opinião adicionada de que algo é de tal 
modo é pior do que o próprio sofrimento, como quando os operados 
ou que sofrem algo semelhante suportam <bem>, mas os que assistem 
<a operação> desfalecem, por causa da opinião de que o que se sucede 
é mau. De fato, quem supõe que algo é por natureza bom, ou mal, ou 
no geral praticável ou impraticável, inquieta-se de vários modos.”   
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grammarians Sextus employs arguments grammati-
cally structured in Greek language? It looks like 
a very evident paradox, and it can be even more 
serious if we remember that Scepticism is often 
accused of inconsistence. But Sextus is not a naïve 
thinker, thus we tried to show that in Against the 
Professors he is against a conception of knowledge 
which is strictly theoretical. Therefore he argues 
against the grammarians who tried to advance 
theories on the structure of Greek language with-
out paying due attention to a crucial feature of any 
languages: the usages. 
On the other hand, Sextus’ attacks do not go 
against the usages, and is precisely guided by these 
usages that he is able to write, because he handles 
the philosophical usage of language by not needing 
grammar skills (in a theoretical sense), except those 
learnt through grammatistic. So the Sextan Scepti-
cism is not inconsistent if we keep in mind that the 
Sceptic does have a practical criterion – the local 
habits – and a scientific method – the empirical ob-
servation. Both the criterion and the method, once 
conjoined as an “empirical observation of habits”, 
are important steps toward the development of a 
conception of knowledge as approximate and can 
be interpreted as a kind of defense of the plurality 
of habits.
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